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Abstract 
 
Grid-World is a working computer model which has been used 
to investigate the search capabilities of artificial agents that 
understand the world in terms of non-conceptual content. The 
results from this model show that the non-conceptual agent 
outperformed the stimulus response agent, and both were 
outperformed by the conceptual agent. This result provides 
quantitative evidence to support the theoretical argument that 
animals and pre-linguistic children may use non-conceptual 
content to understand the world. Modelling these ideas in an 
artificial environment provides an opportunity for a new 
approach to artificial intelligence. 
 
1  Introduction 
 
There does not seem to be a universally agreed definition of intelligence [1]. There 
are, however, some general characteristics that can be attributed to intelligent 
behaviour, and when witnessed in a particular situation a judgement can be made 
about whether a given agent is intelligent or not. One way of explaining thinking is 
to refer to concepts. Many philosophers [2] believe that only language users can 
have concepts, and along with this a view of the world that is objective. Others [3] 
argue that conceptual content has developed out of non-conceptual content, and that 
there must be some sort of objective understanding as a pre-cursor to developing 
into an agent with full conceptual capabilities. 
 
It is the reflective nature of intentions which provides the mechanism to enable 
agents to think about their actions in ways that can lead to goal directed or 
purposeful behaviour. Intentions also form a key element in the belief, desire and 
intention (BDI) architecture and follow on from Bratman’s [4] systematic 
framework for characterising mind and actions in terms of intentions. The 
relationship between beliefs, desires and intentions is easy for us to comprehend as 
it reflects the way we reason about the world in our own conscious minds. It is a 
perfectly reasonable, and largely practical, way to construct an artificial agent. 
However, human reasoning is a conscious process that is intrinsically tied into our 
conceptual understanding of the world. For this reason most of our practical 
reasoning will use conceptual content, hence the success of the BDI architecture as 
an AI technique. 
 
The approach adopted here is one that is based upon the multi-disciplinary 
principles of Cognitive Science. The idea that there is an intentional capacity that 
can be explained in terms of non-conceptual content is important because it frees us 
from linking an intelligent understanding of the world to agents that possess 
language. One difficulty with the general progression of non-conceptual content is 
that it has been largely based on discussion in the philosophical literature. Although 
there is plenty of supportive evidence from experiments using infants and animals, 
there have been few attempts to use computers to model non-conceptual content. 
Grid-World provides an environment that enables the characteristics that embody 
non-conceptual content to be modelled and investigated using artificial agents.   
 
2 Non-conceptual Content 
 
Our understanding of concepts is so dominant in our view of how things are in the 
world, that it is very hard for adult humans to think of anything in the world that is 
not defined conceptually. Holding concepts is clearly a conscious thinking activity, 
so it is the one that we are very aware of. Conceptual content is therefore about 
perceptual beliefs; it is how we believe the world to be. Non-conceptual content, on 
the other hand, is about perceptual experience, it is how the world is presented to us. 
An analogy can be drawn with the difference between analogue and digital. 
Information in the world is basically analogue in nature. For our minds to be able to 
grasp and manipulate concepts it needs to abstract away from the detail, and one 
way to do this is to encode it digitally with a certain level of quantisation.  
 
Non-conceptual content can be defined [5] as a mental state that represents the 
world but which does not require the bearer of that mental state to possess the 
concepts required to specify the way in which they represent the world. According 
to this definition, it is possible for an agent to act as if it holds a concept, when in 
fact it does not. For example, an agent may search a problem space as if it has the 
concept of planning, but upon further investigation it may be revealed that the agent 
did not hold this concept at all. 
 
Agents that are intentional will use intentions to work towards their goal (mean-end 
reasoning), maintain their intentions unless there is good evidence not to, constrain 
the range of options they may consider (constrain future deliberation) and allow 
them to change their beliefs (reason practically) as they discover new features of 
their environment. The ability to hold an intentional attitude has long been attributed 
to concept holders. Non-conceptual content provides an explanative mechanism that 
allows intentions to be attributed to non-language using agents.  
 
Affordance has been established as the term used most frequently to reflect 
Gibson’s ecological view of sensation, first put forward by him in 1950. 
Affordances offer a good mechanism for capturing information about the 
environment, and one that is sufficiently rich to provide the basis for action 
according to a non-conceptual view. If affordance can provide the opportunity, then 
non-conceptual content provides the mechanism to turn perception into action. The 
most immediate source of affordance comes from the agent itself, especially the role 
that the agent’s own body plays in perception. This role of affordance in perception 
may be crucial for implementing artificial agents. 
 
Bermudez draws upon some experimental work from psychology concerning object 
permanence. An agent is said to hold the idea of object permanence if it believes an 
object exists, even when that object is not being directly perceived. The basic 
experimental methodology is to place objects in full view of a very young child and 
then remove the object from view (usually by obscuring it behind a screen). The 
child is then tested to see if it appreciates the fact that the object could still be there. 
In other words to test the child’s conceptual understanding of objects, and in 
particular its understanding of object permanence. The general conclusion has been 
that object permanence only comes with mastery of the concept of objects. 
Bermudez argues, by the following alternative explanation, that this need not be the 
case. It is possible for the child to be ‘aware’ of the object, for example, by showing 
surprise when it apparently moves through a solid screen, yet the same child will not 
search for the object behind the screen. This seems to provide some evidence that 
the child has representational capability, with respect to the object, even when that 
object is out of view, however, the same child obviously does not have the concept 
of an object. 
 
3 Grid-World 
 
Grid-World has been built using an expert system toolkit called Flex1 (and 
associated prolog compiler) which uses its own English-like knowledge 
specification language (KSL). Flex supports frame-based reasoning with 
inheritance, rule-based programming and data-driven procedures. Grid-World 
makes extensive use of rule-based logic and uses frames to organise data. The 
features of Flex make it an attractive option for investigating agents that have basic 
sensory and memory capabilities. 
 
Grid-World has drawn upon some of the ideas behind Brooks’ subsumption 
architecture [6]. Brooks’ general approach is to build robots with relatively simple 
rules and see what sort of behaviours emerge as a result. Grid-World also uses 
relatively simple rules, and behaviours do emerge. This bottom up approach is also 
important in the principal relationship between non-conceptual and conceptual 
content, as it can be argued that creatures that hold concepts may have evolved from 
                                                     
1  Developed and maintained by Logic Programming Associates (LPA) Ltd. 
 
others that had simpler capabilities. However, Grid-World falls well short of 
Brooks’ approach where real robots are used in the real world. 
 
Three different agents are implemented in Grid-World. The first agent – called 
stimulus response (SR) – searches using a combination of wall following and 
random searching and is modelled on the principles of stimulus response 
conditioning. The second agent – called non-conceptual content (CC) – is given the 
capability to recognise and remember features of the environment it has previously 
learned. It is then able to use these to aid any subsequent search. These capabilities 
model a form of non-conceptual content that uses affordances to recognise places. 
The third agent – called conceptual content (CC) – also has memory and place 
recognition capabilities, but it can also form a plan to join the affordances together. 
The ability to plan is a conceptual skill. The three agents can be viewed as steps 
from the simplest to the most sophisticated, and in each case the capabilities of each 
agent build upon those of its predecessor, to ensure that this reflects development 
rather than diversification. 
 
The simple aim for each of the agents in Grid-World is to find its way from home to 
the goal. This choice of task, within an artificial world, has been chosen because it 
mirrors the actions of simple animals. This idea follows the work of Campbell [7] 
who suggests that basic navigation skills are ones that could be explained using non-
conceptual content. Picking up on Gibson’s [8] ecological approach to vision, Grid-
World has affordances built into the environment, and these can be used by the two 
more sophisticated agents in helping them to reach their goal when searching. So the 
overall design principle of Grid-World is one that draws upon comparison with real 
world agents, and this principle is reflected in both the architecture and the rules that 
govern the behaviour of the three types of agent. 
 
3.1 Grid-World Environment 
 
The name ‘Grid-World’ was chosen because the space occupied by the world is 
defined in terms of x and y co-ordinates, where each co-ordinate defines a single 
square within the world. For example, the co-ordinate (4,5) is a single square 4 
spaces to the right (x) and 5 spaces up (y), taking the co-ordinates (1,1) as a point of 
reference that represents the bottom left hand corner of Grid-World. So the whole 
world can be seen as a grid of intersecting lines, with the spaces between the lines 
defining a large number of squares. Each co-ordinate contains either a blank square, 
or a tile representing some feature of the world as will be described below. A visual 
representation of Grid-World, as appears on the computer screen when the program 
is running, is shown in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Screen view of Grid-World 
The entire space is bounded by a continuous wall that occupies all the outer grid 
squares. Each square that makes up a wall contains a blank tile with no labels. In the 
example shown this is a boundary measuring 48 by 30, giving a large internal space 
of 1440 squares. Horizontal and vertical walls are added to introduce features into 
what would otherwise be an open space. These are also shown as blank tiles. A goal 
is defined as a block of one or more squares, and each one is marked with the letter 
D. 
 
Other features of the landscape are also shown as blocks of tiles, each labelled with 
a letter. These represent various landmarks. For example, the block labelled ‘L’ is a 
lake, and the block labelled ‘T’ is a group of trees. The main purpose of the 
landmarks is to provide some visual cues, things in the environment that the agent 
may recognise, and for this reason the agent is able to pass through the landmarks. 
The blocks that have two or three lower case letters represent areas of Grid-World 
that lay between two or more landmarks. These are called affordances as they 
provide the agent with information directly about the environment. One way to think 
of them is as points in the landscape where one or more distant cues intersect. The 
tile marked with an ‘H’ is the home location and is where the agent starts its search. 
The position of the agent at any given point during a search is shown by a tile with 
the letter ‘F’. This was chosen to represent forager, and this tile moves as the agent 
searches the landscape. 
 
Grid-World has been designed to provide the same sort of complexity, for an 
artificial agent, as experienced by a small mammal, for example. The walls are 
primarily to provide some features that can be used by the stimulus response agent, 
recognising that wall following is a basic search strategy used by many animals. The 
walls also provide some variety to the space, making searching a little more 
complicated for all agents. The cues, and associated affordances, are intended to be 
used by the non-conceptual and conceptual agents and mirror some of the features 
used in experiments where mice or rats search mazes. 
 
3.2 Stimulus Response Agent 
 
The basic search characteristics used are a combination of wall following, object 
avoidance and searching open space. An agent moves one square at a time. If it 
finds that a square is occupied by a wall tile it will not enter that square. The agent 
will recognise a wall whenever it finds a continuous string of wall tiles. Whenever it 
finds a wall it will follow it until it reaches the end. The open space search involves 
going in one direction for a number of squares, before turning left or right. The 
number of squares that an agent moves in any one direction is chosen randomly 
from a preset range, and the choice of left or right alternates. This basic strategy 
ensures that all squares can be searched through a combination of wall following 
and the random searching of open space. With this basic strategy the goal is always 
found. The more sophisticated skills needed for the agent to search intelligently are 
built upon these basic characteristics. All agent types will fall back to a random 
search when there is no better choice. 
 
The agents location, and the location of all the Grid-World features, are stored in a 
range of databases. Information is read to and from these databases using actions of 
the format: 
 
read_changes (position(X,Y,T)) 
 
In this example position is the name of the database, x and y are the location co-
ordinates and T is the data being read. 
 
A combination of rules and actions are then used to move the agent according to the 
information retrieved. For example, an action that would start an agent searching 
open space has the format: 
 
Action random_search_left; 
  do n := 0 
  and random_number(12) 
  and while in_open_space 
  and n<random_range 
    do move_left 
    and n :=(n+1) 
  end while . 
 
The agent continues searching until it finds the goal. The program then records a 
range of quantitative data including the number of steps taken to move from home 
to the goal and a list of the affordances visited. 
 
3.2 Non-conceptual Agent 
 
The non-conceptual agent learns during the initial search phase which can follow 
the same path as the stimulus response agent. During this phase, whenever the agent 
finds a point of affordance, it makes an entry into a memory frame. The principle 
behind the memory is for the agent to record the direction of the next point of 
significance, either another affordance or the goal. For this purpose it makes a note 
of its current location and then records the net direction when it reaches the next 
point of significance. This memory also includes the name of the affordance at 
which it was initiated.  
 
An instance of a completed frame is created whenever an affordance is found during 
an initial search. Each instance is given a number and records a start point (starting), 
an end point (ending) and the direction from start to end. The direction is simply 
recorded as a compass bearing that divides the area around any square into four 
quadrants. 
 
In the non-conceptual search mode the agent has access to the additional 
information held in the frames created during the initial search. It uses this data 
whenever it finds an affordance. The principle behind the agent that searches using 
non-conceptual content is that it gains a benefit from understanding the significance 
of the affordances found in the initial search. This significance comes from 
recognising the place and knowing something about the last time it visited this 
place. What it knows is that setting off in a particular direction moves it towards 
another place it would recognise. It does not know that this may eventually lead to 
the goal it just recognises that it did set off in a particular direction last time, so it 
chooses to go this way again. The non-conceptual agent gains this benefit from 
reading the frames made during the initial search. 
 
All other aspects of the search remain the same and the agent still follows walls, for 
example. To ensure that the agent is given no other advantage, apart from setting off 
in a particular direction, when it sets off in the remembered direction it still uses the 
same range of random numbers to move as it does when it is in open space. One 
way to think of the advantage that this agent has is just being ‘nudged’ in a 
potentially successful direction.  
 
The consequence of the data in the memory frame is to point the agent in the general 
direction of the next affordance and set it off in that direction. For affordances that 
are near the goal, it is possible that the agent will be pushed towards the goal. There 
is no guarantee that any instance will point the agent towards another affordance 
closer to the goal. If, during the initial search, the agent happened to find an 
affordance that was further away from the goal, then this is the direction it records, 
and this is the one the non-conceptual agent will use. 
 
3.3 Conceptual Agent 
 
The last search phase, as used by the conceptual agent, is modelled on an agent that 
holds navigational concepts. Most significantly it is able to take a detached view of 
what it has done and plan accordingly. The difference between this search strategy 
and the one used by the non-conceptual agent is best understood by looking at two 
aspects of that search that may not be optimised. During the initial search phase the 
creation of memories is dependent upon the agent finding an affordance and moving 
from that affordance to one that takes it closer to the goal. It is possible (although 
unlikely) for the agent to find the goal during an initial search without finding any 
affordances. Any subsequent non-conceptual search would be identical to an initial 
search as there is no additional information to help the agent. It is more likely that 
the agent will not create a memory for each affordance type as it will not visit them 
all. It is also possible that an agent will move from one affordance to another that is 
further away from the goal. Neither of these will optimise the agent’s chances of 
finding the goal. 
 
Because the conceptual agent can take a detached view of the search space, and it is 
capable of planning, it can be given the optimum memory for each of the affordance 
types before it searches. This plan is created by having a frame for each affordance 
that always points the agent in the direction of the goal. The agent then uses the 
same search strategy as the non-conceptual agent, but one that draws on this optimal 
memory and not what is learned by any other search.  
 
4 Experimental Results 
 
There are three agents. Each one has the same basic sensory and search capabilities. 
The three differ in the way they represent sensations that they detect in the 
environment. The first agent (SR) responds in a strictly law like way to any stimulus 
when choosing the next step. The second agent (NCC) uses sensory information that 
is immediately available to it, combined with memory to assist it in making a choice 
about where to go next. The third agent (CC) uses sensation together with a plan to 
choose the next move. 
 
4.1 Experimental Design 
 
The difference between each agent is the way in which they represent sensory data 
in their environment. Therefore, there is one independent variable; the type of 
representation. In this design there are three levels for the independent variable that 
correspond directly to the implementation of the three agents. The dependent 
variable is the data that records the number of steps it takes the agent to move from 
home to goal. 
 
The experimental hypothesis predicts the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variable. In this case this is the prediction that the search performance 
(dependent variable) will improve as the agent’s search capabilities become more 
sophisticated (independent variable). 
 
Statistical tests were applied to the results to determine whether observed 
differences in the mean were due to the experimental conditions or chance. A result 
was deemed significant if there was a probability of less than 5% that the result 
occurred by chance. 
 
4.2 Results 
 
The statistical data for 40 searches carried out by the stimulus response (SR), non-
conceptual (NCC) and conceptual (CC) agents are shown in figure 2. In this 
experiment the SR agent followed 40 different paths, and each one of these paths 
were used as the initial search (training) for the NCC agent. The CC agent used the 
same pre-set memories for each search. 
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Figure 2 – 40 searches, with 3 types of agent 
 
The mean values for the stimulus response, non-conceptual and conceptual agents 
are 1174, 419 and 290 respectively. These results show a significant difference in 
the search performance of the three agents. 
 
By looking at the data for individual searches, aided by information on the 
distribution of step counts, it can be seen that all three agents manage to find the 
goal in fewer than 100 steps in at least one search. This represents a very good 
search performance, as the minimum path length is 40 steps. At the other end of the 
spectrum it can be seen that the stimulus response agent takes the longest single 
search time of more than 5000 steps. The fact that the stimulus response agent 
reaches both extremes is not surprising as any basically random search method is 
likely, over enough runs, to find the extremes. The overall distribution of searches 
shows more clearly that the non-conceptual and conceptual agent are able to find the 
goal in fewer steps on many more occasions. This is particularly true for the 
conceptual agent which only once took more than a 1000 steps out of 80 searches.  
 
While the results show that there is a clear difference between the search times for 
each of the three agents, the range of search times varies considerably for the 
stimulus response and non-conceptual agents. Other data also shows that the number 
of frames generated by the stimulus response agent also varies across a wide range. 
Figure 3 shows the total number of times that each affordance was used, for each of 
the three agents, during another set of 20 searches.  
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Figure 3 – How often an affordance is used 
 
As can be seen in figure 1, the affordances are located in the ‘open space’ areas of 
Grid-World. These locations were chosen to make sure that the agent would have to 
find the affordances, and not be led directly to them by following the wall, or 
stepping directly into one when it left the end of a wall. The largest affordance (gtb) 
occupies five tiles, and the smallest (bs) three. These sizes were chosen because 
these were respectively placed in larger and smaller areas of open space. 
 
The lss affordance is visited most often by all three types of agent, and bs is visited 
least often. The other three affordances are visited often, and normally occur in each 
search. Looking at which of the affordances is visited just before the goal is reached 
(the last affordance) shows that lss is very dominant in this role, occupying this 
position in just over 73% of the searches carried out in experiment 4. By 
comparison, bs only occupied the last position in just one search. 
 
From these results, it would appear that lss is playing a dominant role in the search 
strategy used by all three agents. This is partly explained by the proximity of lss to 
the goal, although it is not immediately obvious, from the results, or looking at 
figure 1, why lss should be more dominant than ll, for example. After all, both are 
close to the goal and on the same side as the agent’s home. The fact that bs is 
situated on the far side of the goal, which means that the agent has to pass the goal 
to visit it, could be part of the reason that it is often not included in a search very 
often.  
 
Other arrangements of Grid-World were used to explore the impact of different 
environments on the search performance of the agents. As a general rule, the non-
conceptual agent outperformed the stimulus response agent, and both were 
outperformed by the conceptual agent. However, the location of affordances, both in 
absolute numbers and in their relationship to each other and wall, was significant in 
the effect upon both the non-conceptual and conceptual agents. Another set of 
experiments was also able to show that if the non-conceptual agent could string 
together affordances in the correct order, then it could match the performance of the 
conceptual agent. This result re-enforces the idea that the difference between the 
two is rooted in the latter’s ability to plan. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The overall aim of developing Grid-World has been to provide a flexible 
experimental environment that can be used to explore non-conceptual content using 
qualitative data. Using Artificial Intelligence techniques in this way is consistent 
with a cognitive science approach where computer models are used to investigate 
theoretical ideas. Grid-World has provided a robust artificial environment in which 
it has been possible to implement different agents and to test their search 
capabilities. The implementation has also enabled the test environment to be altered 
to explore agent behaviours as they emerged from earlier experiments. 
 
The results from all of the experiments using the stimulus response agent have 
shown that a combination of wall following and searching in open space was 
sufficient to always lead the agent to the goal. However, with search values ranging 
between 40 and 5,000 steps, there was considerable variation and this cannot really 
be called a successful search strategy. 
 
The non-conceptual and conceptual agents both use a memory of affordances to 
give significance to proximal features of their environment that they sense. The 
location and size of affordances within the search space was shown to have a 
measured impact upon the search performance of both agents. These characteristics 
of affordances provide further evidence to support the idea that there is a real 
proximity limit to an agent’s capacity to grasp the significance of an object. If it is 
too far, it is just beyond the agent’s reach. So the distance between any two points of 
affordance must fit with the agent’s capabilities, and when searching there must be a 
sufficient number of well spaced affordances to provide a path. This conclusion is 
supported by the actions of the conceptual agent, which even with a path linking 
affordances, still did less well when affordance were moved near the goal. 
 
Only a very basic memory capability has been given to the non-conceptual agent. In 
particular the memory instance for each affordance is only significant to the agent at 
that unique location and it cannot access memories from one location at any other. 
Further, although the agent can visit an affordance more than once during an initial 
search, it always recalls the result of the last visit. So it cannot learn the best 
direction from many visits. All of these parameters were carefully chosen so as not 
to give the agent any concepts, yet the non-conceptual agent has still consistently 
found the goal in fewer steps than the stimulus response agent. In some way it has 
operated as if it had a concept of searching, not one as sophisticated as the plan held 
by the conceptual agent, but nevertheless one that might convince an observer that it 
held a concept of planning. 
 
This is an exciting conclusion as there is little other experimental evidence to 
support the case for non-conceptual content. However, a more critical reflection tells 
us that much of the performance improvement is closely related to the positions of 
the affordances within a particular environment. This is not to deny that there is an 
agent in Grid-World that can be said to have non-conceptual content, just that it is 
necessary to appreciate the close relationship between such an agent and the 
affordances in its environment.  
 
If the behaviour of animals can be explained in terms of non-conceptual content, 
then there are reasons to believe that conceptual content has evolved from this 
simpler representational capability. If this is the case, then the evolution of 
conceptual content from non-conceptual content provides evidence to support a 
bottom up approach to artificial intelligence. 
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